

The Early Heidegger and the Givenness of Form

(Chapter 2 of Draft MS: *The Logic of Being: Heidegger, Truth, and Time*)

“What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life.” – Wittgenstein

“In Plato’s work, form is the knowledge that fills being. Form doesn’t know any more about it than it says. It is real in the sense that it holds being in its glass, but it is filled right to the brim. Form is the knowledge of being. The discourse of being presumes that being is, and that is what holds it.” -Lacan, Seminar XX, 1972-73

Without a doubt, the radicalization of Husserl’s phenomenology that Heidegger undertook in the years leading up to the publication of *Being and Time* determines in many ways his thinking about being, time, and truth in that book, as well as for many years after. I shall argue that this radicalization can be understood as directed toward a particular set of problems, what might be called (although this is neither Husserl’s terminology nor Heidegger’s) the problems of the *givenness of form*. In particular, Heidegger’s pursuit of these problems between 1919 and 1926 led to his development of the methodologically decisive device of “formal indication” and his penetrating critique of Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness. At the same time, it essentially articulates the guiding interpretation of the ontological and metaphysical tradition, from the Greeks to the 20th century, which Heidegger would maintain throughout the rest of his career: his interpretation of this tradition as committed to the understanding of Being as presence and of time as based upon the presence of the punctual “now”. As I shall attempt to show, it is by pursuing the problems of the givenness of form that the young Heidegger first develops his original phenomenological critique of this historically dominant conception of being as presence. The critique is closely connected, on the one hand, with the young Heidegger’s radical rethinking of the structure of logic on the basis of his own original re-working of the problematic of truth and, on the other, with his developing understanding of the structure of Dasein in terms of its own originary kind of temporality, wholly distinct from what the tradition understands as the temporality of the subject, or of the psychological being that thinks.

What I mean by “form” here is something general, but also relatively straightforward: I mean to indicate whatever gives *unity* to a plurality of phenomena, or what makes a *one* out of the many of appearances. This is meant to evoke Plato’s appeal to the idea in one of its most important aspects, that of the “one

over many,” or what justifies calling the diversity of a set of appearances by one and the same name or giving them the same account. Equally, though, it gestures toward the closely related problem of predication, to which Plato’s ever-developing thinking about forms and participation is constantly directed. This is a problem that is already marked in both Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought of the structure of the *logos apophantikos*, the proposition or assertive statement, but is equally central to the problems of contemporary formal and phenomenological logic. For Heidegger as well as other twentieth-century thinkers, this problem is understood, at least in part, as the problem of the structure and *unity* of the predicative proposition, judgment, or assertion. In his thinking of the ground for this unity, Heidegger comes to see the historical tradition of logical and ontological thought, from Plato to Husserl, as gesturing, albeit obscurely, toward the possibility of an original disclosure of the sense of Being itself.

In particular, during the years leading up to 1926, Heidegger’s historically radicalized development of phenomenological methodology focuses, above all else, on the question of the *availability* of form, on what the tradition understands as its presence or presentation, as structuring element, precondition or possibility of synthesis, to the being that thinks: the person, psyche, subject or self. This leads Heidegger to pose a set of radical and penetrating questions about the relationship that Plato figures as *methexis* or participation, as well as to what he comes to see as Husserl’s own silent and unquestioning presupposition of the priority of the region of pure consciousness and his consequent failure to inquire into the *being* of the entity that possesses or inhabits it. More generally, Heidegger shows during these years that the entire the tradition from Plato to Husserl invokes the givenness of form as the priority of the *a priori*, the unthought temporality of that which always comes before. But although, as Heidegger argues, the true temporal sense of the *a priori* has, despite being constantly presupposed, never yet been positively understood within the tradition, Husserl’s own phenomenological methods serve to point the way toward a deeper understanding of the ground of its very possibility. This, in turn, points to Heidegger’s radicalized recapitulation of the question of the givenness of form as the question of the givenness of time, and finally to the suggestion of the opening of a deeper, more original sense of time, beyond the tradition’s prioritization of the “now” and constant presupposition of the priority of presence.

I am aware that portraying Heidegger as concerned with “form” in this sense is likely to appear anachronistic and perhaps even un-Heideggerian. Heidegger’s recurrent dismissals of results derived from “formal logic” and of analyses that are “merely formal” (as opposed to genuinely phenomenological), for instance, are well-known. And in his analyses of the structures of Dasein and world in *Being and Time* and beyond, Heidegger does not always privilege the issue of the kinds of generality and unity that these structures must display. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, behind each of these structures is the thought of a specific kind of unity of phenomena, and this thought of unity underlies, in profound ways, Heidegger’s interlinked and developing conceptions of truth and time, as well as his critique of the tradition’s understanding of being as presence. For with his own pursuit of the problem of the force and availability of the idea in its relationship to the things of experience, Plato took up the problem of the relationship of Being and thinking, the original relationship already thought by Parmenides as a simple unity or sameness of thinking in the sense of *nous* with the totality of what is. If

the problematic taken up by Plato from Parmenides and thought in terms of the obscure relationship of “participation” bears an original relationship with the question that both Heidegger and contemporary logic treat (though with different results) as that of the possibility and sense of predication, then there is again a relationship of this problematic to the question of the nature and kind of unity that makes beings or entities intelligible at all. And if Heidegger comes, during the formative years 1921-26, to see the predicative structure of the proposition, along with its meaning and its truth, as always secondary to, and dependent on, a more originary disclosure of things themselves, this does not preclude that the original conception of primary givenness (the –as- structure) that Heidegger develops over these years remains a profound form of unity.

The formal dimension of the “one over many,” the question of the availability of this dimension to thought, and above all the question of the ultimate ground of the unity of being and thinking will thus, as I shall argue, never have ceased to determine Heidegger’s analyses, even as he moves to thinking of the basis of this unity in increasingly radical terms of difference, withdrawal, and ex-stasis. In the last part of the paper, I will suggest that understanding Heidegger’s conception of logic, truth, and time in terms of the formal problems of the one and the many, even where he did not ostensibly do so himself, can point the way to further possibilities for the development, and deepening, of Heidegger’s great problem of the possibility of a givenness of Being itself, outside or beyond the traditional understanding of being as presence.

I.

In a 1963 retrospective essay devoted to tracing his own “way to phenomenology,” Heidegger recalls one of the particular issues in Husserl’s phenomenology that, as he studied with Husserl in the early 1920s, yielded a special directive for Heidegger’s own developing sense of the application of phenomenological methods to the problem of being:

As I myself practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching, and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the “manifold meaning of being.” (“My way to phenomenology,” p. 78).

In the same essay, Heidegger recounts how he had been fascinated with Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* since the beginning of his adult academic studies in 1909-10, but without, at that early time, “gaining sufficient insight into what fascinated me.” (p. 75). When Heidegger returned to the *Logical Investigations* (and in particular to the doctrine of categorial intuition) in the early 1920s, amidst his transformative and dramatic encounter with Aristotle, he had also already begun, at first cautiously and inexplicitly, to voice the radical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness that would

provide an essential impetus to his own conception of the project of a “fundamental ontology” grounded in a hermeneutic of Dasein.

In the course of developing this critique, Heidegger would come to doubt many aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological project: its basis in what was, for Heidegger, the unexamined privilege of the being of the conscious subject, its prioritization of theoretical understanding over the concrete life in which all theory is rooted, its basic (and, for Heidegger, ungrounded) distinction between the domains of the real, factual accomplishment of intentional acts and the ideal realm of their content or sense. Even Husserl’s vaunted “principle of principles,” holding that all phenomenological knowledge must be grounded in the acceptance of what intuition directly presents to consciousness, would come to seem to Heidegger to be an untenable expression of a transcendental subjectivism that fails to penetrate deeply enough into the “things themselves” in its uncritical assumption of the foundedness of all knowledge in intuitive presence.¹

But in the 1963 retrospective, Heidegger also alludes positively to an essential connection between Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition and his own radicalized phenomenological understanding of the disclosure of beings in truth. What, then, is categorial intuition, and how did the young Heidegger come to see it as an essential phenomenological method, even beyond its application within what he came to see as the narrow confines of Husserl’s phenomenology? Most directly, Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition arises in response to questions internal to his own phenomenological account of truth and knowledge. On this account, knowledge consists in a particular kind of “identifying” synthesis between an intentional act that intends an object or state of affairs and a distinct act of intuition or presentation that “fulfills” this intention. For instance, in a simple perceptual act, an object of perception may be intended in an unfulfilled way as I take myself to see it; if the object indeed exists and presents itself, the act is fulfilled and knowledge is attained. Husserl understands this as an “identifying synthesis” that connects the meaning-intention with the actual presence of the object as it is in itself and is directly given (cf. section 37).

Indeed, Husserl suggests in the introduction to the sixth *Logical Investigation*, it is in terms of such an “identifying synthesis” that we must understand the phenomenological idea of “being in the sense of truth”; here we have, Husserl says, the “single...phenomenological situation” upon which all of the “varying notions of truth” must be based. The complete fulfillment that occurs in the “identifying synthesis,” moreover, is, Husserl says, “‘correspondence’ rightly understood, *the adaequatio rei ac intellectus*”; here we have, in other words, a complete and final correspondence of the intellect with the givenness of the object as it is in itself.²

¹ Cf. “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” pp. 63-64. [expression of the prejudice of all W. philosophy of Being as presence (thus intuition)].

² (here we may see Husserl’s phenomenological formulation of what Heidegger repeatedly cites as the motto of the traditional “correspondence” theory of truth).

It is this conception of the universal structure of truth that leads Husserl, in connection with the complexities of the various kinds of intentional acts, to introduce the concept of “categorical” as distinct from merely “sensuous” intuition. In a simple act of perceiving an object, knowledge can be understood simply as the correspondence of an intending act with a purely sensory fulfillment that presents that individual object in its sensuous appearance. Here, for instance, I perceive a red surface; the sensory quality of redness is given directly and simply in the fulfilling intuition. But it is very often the case, (as, for instance, in the acts underlying even simple predicative judgments and assertions) that what we have knowledge of has, essentially, a form and structure that goes beyond simple, individual perceptual presentations. I may have, for instance, a perceptual experience that yields not only the simple seeing of an individual object, but also of *how things stand* with the presented object (or objects) as well:

In the case of a perceptual statement, not only the inwrought nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfillment through our underlying percept. [For instance]...we do not merely say ‘I see this paper, an inkpot, several books’, and so on, but also ‘I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open’, and so on. (p. 339)

This possibility, that complex and structured states of affairs as well as simple objects can be given intuitively, essentially complicates the phenomenological account of truth as “identifying synthesis.” In particular, we must pose, as Husserl now does, the question of “What may and can furnish fulfillment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of ‘*categorical form*’ to which, e.g., the copula belongs?” Since, Husserl says, there is nothing in the sensory givenness of the objects to correspond with such elements of the complex judgment as are expressed by words such as “‘the’, ‘a’, ‘some,’ ‘many’ ‘few,’ ‘two,’ ‘is’, ‘not’, ‘which’, ‘and,’ ‘or,’ etc.,³ we must recognize, in addition to sensuous intuitions, the possibility of a distinct kind of wholly non-sensuous intuition which yields knowledge of the possible forms of objects and their combination and relation, including the sense of “being” as expressed in the copula of a predicative assertion such as “the paper is white”. In fact, Husserl suggests, categorical intuition is involved even in minimally complex nominal presentations such as the presentation of the “the white paper”. Here, too, there is an essential relationship in the object that must be able to be given, or presented, in an adequate (sensory or non-sensory) presentation of the object as it is in itself. More generally, Husserl says, all talk of “logical form” must be understood in terms of the kind of structure that is added by categorical intuition to the simple “material” of objects presented. In any case of complex, structured presentation, there will be aspects of what is presented that go beyond the simple, sensory material itself. In each such case, Husserl argues, it is therefore necessary to acknowledge the givenness of structure or form that goes beyond mere sensory intuition, yielding possible knowledge of the properties, aspects, and relations (logical as well as empirical) of the things as they are in themselves. Indeed, according to Husserl, it is in categorical intuition that *universals* and types are first given to us as objects of knowledge. In particular, on the basis of several acts of intuition of individuals, it is possible that a new kind of “abstractive” act occurs in

³ find this.

which an object of a new type is given – the universal under which each of the several particulars stands. (p. 357) Although this new objectivity remains abstractively *founded* on wholly sensory presentations, it also goes beyond the individual sensory presentations in yielding intuitive access to an “ideal object”, the “very sort” shared by them.⁴

The doctrine of categorial intuition as a wholly distinct, non-sensory form of givenness of logical form and ideal objects is thus Husserl’s answer to the traditional question of the accessibility of categories and universals, which was first pursued as such by Aristotle had developed in close connection with his own conception of formal, syllogistic logic. At the same time, however, it points back, beyond Aristotle, to the issues involved in Plato’s appeal to forms as paradigms or exemplars of qualities, properties or relations and to the problems of their manifestation in perceptible reality and their capability of being grasped by the mind. In particular, it is the possibility of predication, whereby an object is characterized as having some property or other, or more generally appears *as* something or other at all, in which Plato, like Husserl, finds the basic imperative for a theory of the givenness of form, which is for Husserl supplied by the doctrine of categorial intuition. This is so not only in the middle-period dialogues, where Plato sees a sensible particular’s possession of a specific feature or property as a matter of its “participation” in a form or idea, but even more so (and in a somewhat different way) in late dialogues such as the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Theatetus* and *Philebus*, where, perhaps in response to Plato’s own dissatisfactions with the middle-period theory of forms, the structured logos or sentence is seen as the site of the productive “mixing” or blending of forms into a more complex synthetic/diaretic logical unity. Husserl’s conception of the availability of logical and categorial form also bears comparison [though I will not carry out this comparison here] with more contemporary conceptions of logical form and its basis, for instance the conception that figures centrally in the semantics and metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, whereby logical form pervades the world and first makes possible the meaningfulness of structured language in relation to the states of affairs it represents. More generally, as I have argued elsewhere, Husserl’s conception can usefully be compared to the variety of conceptions of logical structure and categorial form that remain current in analytic thinking; these conceptions tend to develop from Frege’s famous context principle and locate the ultimate basis of logical form in the logical articulation and inferential relations of sentences or propositions.

In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* of 1929, Husserl further clarifies the phenomenologically crucial dimension of the logical givenness of form as supported by the possibility of categorial intuition. Here, in characterizing the totality of a phenomenological logic devoted, as a whole, to the structure of judgments, Husserl distinguishes between the levels of a “formal logic” devoted only to the possible forms of judgments and a “transcendental” logic that goes beyond this to characterize the evidential and other aspects of judgments by virtue of which they become candidates for possible truth. According to Husserl, the study of the possible relations of judgments in accordance with fundamental laws of validity, and most importantly the law of non-contradiction (p. 54), yields a “pure analytic apophantics” or a general theory of the possible forms of judgment and possibilities for their

⁴ later distinction between categorial intuition and eidetic intuition (seeing of essences) – cf. *Exp. and Judgment*.

conjunction in the unity of a statement or theory (pp. 65-66). Significantly, Husserl sees this “analytic apophantics” also as yielding general categorical structures such as that of the state of affairs, the object, and other general categorical determinations, as well as unity, plurality, and more complex mathematical structures ; as such, this analytic apophantics is capable of underlying a general and comprehensive formal-mathematical ontology that functions as an a priori formal theory of the possible structures of all objects and objectivities – p. 78, 88-89.

This is to be supplemented with a “transcendental logic” that, going beyond the mere constraint of the law of non-contradiction, yields a synthetic theory of the givenness of material-apriori provinces “in one totality”, i.e. the totality and unity of “world”. (p. 150). This involves extending the formal-analytic investigations of formal apophantics and ontology into the consideration of various material regions and the different kinds and degrees of *evidence* involved in the acquisition of knowledge in each of these domains. In accordance with the later Husserl’s “genetic” phenomenology, the domain of transcendental logic is seen, along with the unity of the world that it articulates, as constituted by a transcendental subjectivity that gives unity and normativity to all possible empirical theories of the world. Nevertheless, this “transcendental” logic remains rigorously grounded in the first, purely analytic and apophantic level of logic, and in a certain sense both actually remain “formally” determined. In particular, both levels of logical theory remain wholly dependent on non-sensory, categorical intuition of form to specify their relative articulations of the specific formal and material ontological domains that they yield. In both cases, what remains essential is the possible givenness of *ideal* structures and objects, in which, according to Husserl, a consciousness is formed of the ideal judgment, argument, etc. as “not merely quite alike or similar” in their various empirical instances, but rather “numerically, identically, the same”. Thus, although the instances of the “appearance of the judgment” in consciousness may be multiple, it is possible to attain an intuitive awareness of the judgment itself as an objectivity outside of temporal determination and identically the same in each of its appearances.

Here, Husserl’s argument extends the devastating critique of psychologism that he already undertook in the “Prolegomena to pure logic” at the beginning of the *Logical Investigations*. Whereas the psychological occurrences of thoughts and judgments, and their expressions in language, appear multiply and at discrete temporal moments, it is possible to obtain an awareness and evidence of them as single, identical objects not determined as existing at any particular point or span in time. This is, according to Husserl, an original form of presentation of the judgment as such, a presentation capable of underlying its multiple appearance at discrete times and in various instances, but itself giving its object as outside time and independent of temporal determination. The judgment as given in this way, on the abstractive basis of sensory intuition but essentially through categorical intuition, is an “irreal” ideality which, though like all “irrealities” capable of participating, in its own way, in temporally determined states of affairs and situations but nevertheless independent of time in itself.

II.

From the beginning of his academic career, Heidegger's investigations of contemporary thinkers and the historical tradition show a deep and central concern with the question of the source and provenance of categories in relation to the psychology of the thinking subject. In the first, doctoral qualifying dissertation of 1913, *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*, Heidegger applies Husserl's critique of psychologism about the basis of judgment to the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, Theodor Lipps, Heinrich Meier, and Franz Brentano. Two years later, the *Habilitationsschrift*, titled "The theory of the categories and meaning in Duns Scotus," had exhaustively examined the problem of the origin of categories in Scotus' scholastic philosophy, with particular emphasis on the origination of a "material determination" of formal categories in relation to the phenomena of unity, reflexivity, and what Scotus called *haecceitas* or "thisness". Here, Heidegger already draws on the phenomenology of Emil Lask, who had developed Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition to describe the pre-theoretical or pre-cognitive givenness of categories in immediate, factual experience.⁵

In the course "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," given in the "war emergency semester" of 1919, Heidegger takes up the problem of the "essence of worldview" and considers critically the methodological and thematic views of the neo-Kantians Natorp, Rickert, and Windelband about our access to categories, the forms of judgment, and the sources of value and truth. Here, Heidegger raises a challenge to the neo-Kantian "critical-teleological" method that will become increasingly important to his own thinking and eventually merge with his developing criticism of Husserl. For the neo-Kantian "philosophy of value," truth appears only in the category of what "holds value" [in the sense of *gelten*] or what amounts to a teleological norm for thought. Here, the category of "value" in this sense is moreover sharply distinguished from the existence of what is in being: the realm of what holds value and truth is conceived as wholly distinct from actual existence, and the relationship between the realms left somewhat obscure. But, Heidegger objects, it would be impossible to determine the normativity of value and truth, or what is to be valued or taken as true, if this "normativity" did not somehow have a basis in what is given in the concreteness of actual, lived experience. Thus, according to Heidegger, "Teleological-axiomatic grounding would lose all sense *without a pre-given* chooseable and accessible *something, a what.*" (p. 33)

Heidegger next attempts to determine the possibility of this "material giving" by which concrete, pre-theoretical life experience yields access to the theoretical categories and structures by means of which we can understand the structure of judgment and the possibility of truth. Here, what is thought in neo-Kantianism as the "psychic" realm of the givenness of ideals and values must be interrogated as to its own status and kind of existence: thus the whole problematic "concentrates itself" on the single question of "how the psychic is to be given as a sphere." (p. 47) And since, according to Heidegger, "the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical" (p. 47), it is essential to determine how the structure of categories might already be given in pre-theoretical experience and in the kind of availability of objects that is displayed in ordinary, non-theoretical life. This demands, in particular, that we come to see concrete lived experience as a continuous temporal flow of change

⁵ Kisiel, p. 27., crowell, etc.

already endowed with meaning, not what “pass[es] in front of me like a thing” or even “a fixed process, but an ongoing event of appropriation [here Heidegger, suggestively, uses for the first time the term “Ereignis,” which will much later become one of the key words of his thought] which is neither “inner” nor “outer,” neither “physical” nor “psychical”, but rather “lives out of one’s ‘own-ness’” and only in this way. (p. 60).

How, then, does the flux of concrete experience with its event-like, appropriative character actually suffice to point toward the formal categories of judgment, being, and truth? And how might these categories actually be determined theoretically on the basis of their pre-givenness in concrete, lived experience? Heidegger sees Husserl’s phenomenology, here understood as a “pre-theoretical primordial science” (p. 49) as holding the answer to these problems. In particular, a rigorous practice of “phenomenological seeing” allows the “pre-worldly” “experienceable as such” to be elicited and thereby to point toward the level of the “formally objective” which is not limited to the categories and structures of objects, but itself refers back to the “fundamental level of life in and for itself.” (p. 89). The key to this reciprocal movement between pre-theoretic experience and theoretical recapitulation is what Heidegger calls, in the closing pages of the course, a “hermeneutical intuition” which functions as an “originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the receipts and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out.” (p. 89)

In the 1923 course “Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity,” Heidegger further specifies the “hermeneutical” methodology of the eliciting and demonstration of the formal dimension of ontology from out of the pre-theoretical factual givenness of concretely experienced life. Emboldened by his decisive and transformative confrontation of Aristotle, Heidegger is now willing to criticize the totality of “traditional ontology” since the Greeks, as constantly having in view what is really only a specific modality of being, namely “being-an-object.” In so doing, Heidegger suggests, traditional ontology systematically blocks access to “that being which is decisive within philosophical problems,” namely Dasein itself.⁶ In particular, Heidegger says in the course of a discussion of Max Scheler, the philosophical tradition presupposes the guideline of the traditional definition of man as “animal rationale” and thereby places extant, objective beings in advance in “definite categorial forms” that are pre-determined by this definition. By contrast, hermeneutics in Heidegger’s sense has as its thematic object “in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time” [jeweilen das eigene Dasein] (p. 21); Heidegger defines “facticity” in terms of the “ownness” and “appropriation” [eigen, Aneignung] of this being. He emphasizes that Dasein, so conceived, is not to be understood as “human being” in any familiar sense, or indeed as an answer to the question “what is man?”; in fact, facticity as the Dasein which is in each case our own “initially contains nothing of the ideas of “ego,” person, ego-pole, center of acts.” (p. 24) Indeed, in the hermeneutics of facticity, the expressions

⁶ p. 2

“human Dasein” and “human being” are explicitly to be avoided (p. 21) and “even the concept of the self is, when employed here, not to be taken as something having its origin in an ‘ego’!” (p. 24) ⁷

The critique of the humanism of the rational animal, which Heidegger voices here, will remain, in various forms, a fixture of his critical discussions of the tradition throughout much of the rest of his career. Here, although Heidegger still conceives of his own method of hermeneutical inquiry into facticity as simply an application of Husserl’s own phenomenological method of seeing, the critique nevertheless yields the terms in which he will first begin to offer some cautious criticisms of Husserl’s project, or at least of what he sees as its “misunderstanding” in the further development of the phenomenological tendency, in Husserl and others, after the *Logical Investigations*. In particular, on Heidegger’s gloss, phenomenology arises in close connection with the rapid development of psychology at the end of the 19th century, at a time when “the work of philosophy was ... applied mainly to the phenomenon of consciousness” (p. 55) and epistemology and logic were widely thought to have a psychological foundation. By contrast, the *Logical Investigations* boldly asked about the kind of being possessed by the “objects about which logic speaks”; this questioning yields Husserl’s detailed study of content and meaning, as well as his decisive development of the concept of “intentionality” already suggested by Brentano. Nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, the *Logical Investigations* have largely been misunderstood, for instance as primarily a contribution to epistemology in line with neo-Kantianism, and the further development of phenomenology has exhibited four moments that jointly tend to distort its original sense and even render impossible its fundamental mode of investigation. First, the thematic domain of “consciousness” has been “held fast” as the proper domain for phenomenological investigation and as the ur-region including the whole of the real, and this has led to a predominance of epistemological rather than ontological questions, as well as the introduction of transcendental idealism as the basic position of phenomenological research. Second, the results of the investigations which Husserl first carried out in the field of logic were unjustly applied to other domains, leading to the presupposition of a specific (and, Heidegger implies, inappropriate) model of inquiry across all fields, and third, the “drive for a system” has come to predominate. (p. 57) Finally, all of this has resulted in a “general watering down” that lets phenomenological research sink toward a “wishy-washiness, thoughtlessness,” and a lamentable general tendency toward mystification.

Heidegger rails against all of these trends, albeit without making completely clear which of them he attributes to Husserl himself and which to his followers in the “philosophical industry” that phenomenology has become, and calls for a revitalization of phenomenology that does not define it in terms of any privileged domain of being or fixed methodological model, but rather as “a how of research which makes the objects in question present in intuition and discusses them only to the extent that they are there in such intuition.” (p. 57). This provides the essential guideline for the “hermeneutics of facticity” which always interprets the phenomena on the basis of Dasein’s “forehaving” of them as they are actually given in concrete, factual life (pp. 61-62) and in the phenomena of Dasein’s “having-itself-there” and “always-being-in-such-a-manner.” In particular, Heidegger suggests: “The forehaving in

⁷ [Heid adds “cf intentionality and its *arche*”].

which Dasein (in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time) stands for this investigation can be expressed in a formal indication: *the being-there of Dasein (factual life) is being in a world.*" (p. 62). In particular, in the movement from Dasein's factual life to the formal indication of its structure, Heidegger discovers "significance" in the sense of "being-there in the how of a definite signifying and pointing" as the fundamental characteristic of Dasein's capacity of encountering worldly things and hence, in a sketchy analysis that already anticipates some of the main categories of *Being and Time's* first division, as the fundamental structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world, further to be articulated into the phenomena of "disclosedness," "familiarity" and "the unpredictable and comparative." (sections 23-25).

In specifying the general structures of Dasein and world that are thus hermeneutically articulated on the basis of the fore-having of concrete life, Heidegger makes use of a methodological device that he had first introduced in the course "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" of 1920-21 and which, as recent commentary has emphasized, plays an essential role in specifying his method of analysis throughout the early 1920s as well as in *Being and Time*.⁸ This is the device of "formal indication." By means of formal indication, the concreteness of factual experience points "back" to the more universal structures that are its basis in the structurally articulated phenomenon of Dasein itself. In particular, in introducing "formal indication" in the 1920-21 course, Heidegger emphasizes a distinction already drawn by Husserl between two types of universalization. Generalization is one type: in generalization, we move from the individual objects or phenomena to their genus or type. This is to be distinguished, however, from formalization: in formalization, we do not simply move from a phenomenon to the higher genus under which it falls, but rather elicit its structure and sense, including the distinctive way in which it is given. The "formal indication" is an indication or pointer to this structure and sense, not limited to "formalization" in the sense of ordering or mathematizing, but rather capable of pointing out the more comprehensive and fundamental structure that Dasein and world shows themselves as having in the course of concrete hermeneutical (phenomenological) interpretation.⁹

As Daniel Dahlstrom has recently argued, formal indication may thus be distinguished from other modes of signification or demonstration in that the achievement of formal indication is intended, constitutively, to involve (and potentially transform) the agency of the indicator herself; through the accomplishment of the formal indication we can achieve a fundamental kind of insight into the structures of what we must, constitutively, recognize in each case as *our own* Dasein in its concrete, temporal, unfolding. Formal indication is thus emphatically *not* a way of abstractly describing the forms or categories of human life or of entities in general from an abstract, theoretical position, and in the "hermeneutics of facticity" course Heidegger emphasizes that a formal indication "can only be filled out by looking in the direction of its concrete source in intuition" and is "always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed universal proposition." (p. 62). Nevertheless, though a formal indication is not a generalizing

⁸ Kisiel, Dahlstrom, van Buren, etc.

⁹ Kisiel, pp. 165-170.

description or a theoretical ordering, it remains *formal* in at least two respects. First, the use of the formal indication in connection with the hermeneutic, interpretive method of inquiry that Heidegger had developed by 1923 and would continue to employ in *Being and Time* is precisely to indicate, on the basis of given, factual experience, more universal, unitary, and constitutive structures of Dasein as such; this is not the description of categories of objects present at hand but, as developed in Division I of *Being and Time* as a “fundamental ontology”, the necessary pre-condition for any possible clarification of the modes in which objects and phenomena may be given at all. Second, as Heidegger points out in the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* course of 1921-22, (p. 33), the formal indication remains formal in that it has a *binding* character – it essentially links the diverse phenomena given in the heterogeneity of lived experience back to the unity of a single formal structure in which the distinct modes of being both of individual objects, and of the world itself, come into view.

III

By 1923, Heidegger was thus already in essential possession of the distinctive methodology for the elicitation of the formal structure of Dasein that he would employ in the “preliminary fundamental hermeneutic of Dasein” in Division I of *Being and Time*. Over the next several years, his further radicalization of the methodology first suggested by Husserl for the demonstration of what were for him the atemporal categories of being, would lead Heidegger to undertake a devastating critique of his erstwhile teacher and to violently re-open the most fundamental questions concealed beneath the traditional determination of the senses of being and time. This route from Husserlian phenomenology to this dramatic re-opening of the fundamental questions of philosophy is most evident in two courses from the period immediately preceding the finalization of *Being and Time*: The course “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena to a phenomenology of History and Nature” from 1925, and the comprehensive “Logic: The question of truth” of 1925-26. In these courses, we can witness not only the methodologically instructive “back-story” to the use of the phenomenological method in *Being and Time*, but also, beyond this, the way in which the guiding question of the givenness of form which Heidegger posed to existing phenomenology along with the whole preceding philosophical tradition led him to the profound and original question of time itself.

In the 1925 course, Heidegger opens the project of a “history of the concept of time” intended to clarify and lay out the fundamental senses of temporality underlying the various specific sciences and “domains of being as such”, including importantly the domains of nature and history. (p. 5). In order to elicit the fundamental significance of time as it is interpreted across these domains, it is essential that we employ a mode of investigation that is neither historiological nor systematic, but rather phenomenological (p. 7). In particular, the phenomenological mode of investigation, which precedes both narrowly historiographical and abstract, systematic forms of investigation of time, is necessary in order to clarify how the basic question of philosophy, the question of the *being* of entities, falls into decline and distortion with the theoretical determination of the various domains of reality as “temporal, extratemporal, and supratemporal.” (p. 6).

Heidegger focuses his explication of phenomenology here on the interpretation, and radicalization, of what he sees as its three most important discoveries so far. The first is the discovery of intentionality as the basic structure of “lived experience as such” that makes possible all judging, meaning, and understanding (p. 29). Here, criticizing what he sees as misinterpretations of the basic structure of phenomenology by Dilthey and Rickert, Heidegger emphasizes the inadequacy of representational theories of awareness and consciousness: in a simple intentional act of perception, for instance the perceiving of the chair before me, there is no secondary representation of the object but rather simply the direct presence in perception of the chair itself (p. 37-38). More generally, according to Heidegger, intentionality is deeply misinterpreted if it is understood as a relationship between the distinct spheres of the psychic and the physical; this misinterpretation, ultimately drawn from the ontology of the natural sciences, is at the root of the representationalist picture (p. 35) and fundamentally mischaracterizes the actual nature of intentionality, which is that of a purely “psychic” structure of comportment in which objects and phenomena may nevertheless be given directly “in bodily presence,” just as they are in themselves. Nevertheless, the nature of this “psychic structure” itself raises important and fundamental questions which, Heidegger now ventures to assert, even Husserl has not yet answered in a satisfying way. In particular, in the development of phenomenology so far, “The character of the psychic itself was left undetermined, so that that of which intentionality is the structure was not brought out in the original manner demanded by intentionality.” (p. 46). According to Heidegger, although Husserl has tried to go beyond the “psychic restriction” of intentionality with his late theory of the universal structure of reason, even this development does not succeed in attaining the “more radical internal development” of the theory of intentionality that is now necessary. In particular, Heidegger suggests, “it must...be flatly stated that what the belonging of the *intentionum* to the *intention* implies is obscure. “ Even with Husserl’s extended efforts, “how the being-intended of an entity is related to that entity remains puzzling.” (p. 47)

The second major discovery which Heidegger sees phenomenology as having made is that of categorial intuition. Heidegger here rehearses Husserl’s conception of evidence as the “identifying synthesis” of fulfillment and of truth as the *adequatio intellectus ad rem*, or the “being-identical” of what is intended and what is intuited. (p. 51). Already in this conception, Heidegger suggests, there is a basic and important ambiguity. According to Husserl’s theory, in a successful intentional act that attains truth, the meaning-intention is actually brought into coincidence with the fulfilling intuition of its object; this is the actual performance of the “identifying synthesis” of truth. Is, then, truth to be identified with the standing and atemporal “subsistence” of the relationship of identity between what is intended and what is actually given? Or is it rather to be identified with the actual, particular and datable act of bringing-together of the intention and the intended? In the first case, truth will be the standing, always-possible correlate of a possible act of synthesis or identification, but will not be identified with any such act; in the second, by contrast, it will be an aspect or achievement of such an act itself. This ambiguity, which Heidegger suggests characterizes any and all accounts of truth as correspondence, becomes sharpened if we consider the phenomenological account of even a simple assertion made on the basis of direct perception, for instance: “the chair is yellow.” Here again, we may consider the “being-yellow” of the chair in either of two radically different ways. First, the *being*-yellow of the chair may be emphasized –

that is, we can take it that the truth of the assertion consists in its being able to present the chair as “really” or “truly” yellow, in the subsisting and standing relation of identity between the *content* of the act that intends it as yellow and the chair as it is in itself. Second, however, we can emphasize the being-yellow of the chair, and under this conception we have in view an actual aspect or structural moment of the state of affairs itself. (p. 54). In the first case, the “is” of the true predicative assertion “the chair is yellow” is again understood as “being in the sense of truth as the subsistence of identity;” in the second case it is understood “in the sense of the copula interpreted as a structural moment of the state of affairs itself.” (p. 54). But because these two senses of being and truth have never been clearly distinguished within phenomenology, Heidegger suggests, there remains within Husserl’s conception a basic confusion with respect to the sense of being itself. In fact, however, both confusions can be avoided if we understand truth in a third, more radical sense, one that refers neither to a subsisting relation of abstract identity between intention and fulfillment, nor to the actual performance of any act of identification. This third and (according to Heidegger) more basic sense of truth is one grounded in the intuited entity itself, which itself “provides the demonstration” of the truth of any assertion or statement about it. This is, Heidegger suggests, “the concept of truth which also emerged very early in Greek philosophy”; it is the concept of truth as *aletheia* or the disclosure of the entity itself, which Heidegger here suggests means that “Truth comes down to *being*, to *being-real*.” (p. 53)

In the Logic course, Heidegger further clarifies what he sees as the implications of this third, most fundamental understanding of truth for the disclosure of beings and situations and for the structure of the logic of assertions and propositions. In particular, the truth and falsity of all propositions and assertions is grounded in a prior level of disclosure of beings. On this level, truth does not yet have the propositionally articulated structure of predication and the copula, but is simply the disclosure of “something *as* something.” (p. 121) This primary “as-structure” is what Heidegger calls the “hermeneutical ‘as’” to distinguish it from the secondary, “apophantic” “as-structure” of the articulated proposition; crucially, the original, hermeneutical “as” characterizes the kind of disclosure involved in everyday coping and handling of everyday objects and situations, and so may be considered to precede and condition the explicit formation of predicative judgments. (p. 122). In an extremely close and detailed reading of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, book 9, section 10, Heidegger attempts to show how Aristotle’s own official theory of the *logos apophantikos* (or propositional statement) as a synthetic/diaretic structure capable of truth and falsity (that is, a structure formed of the combination and separation of distinct propositional elements) is itself essentially preconditioned by this original, disclosive sense of truth and the primary hermeneutic “as-” structure. (pp. 136-157). This leads Heidegger further to characterize this primary hermeneutic structure, in its conditioning of propositional truth, as essentially including three constitutive moments: i) an orientation toward the uncovering of things (or a “prior intending and having of the subject matter”); ii) a showing of the subject matter as something else; iii) the possibility of synthesizing something with something. (p. 158). But what is most important in connection with Heidegger’s development of phenomenological methods is the way in which this analysis yields a primary sense of truth that owes nothing to identity, correspondence, or correlation – either the actual identity of acts or the synthesis of meanings – but rather sees truth as pointing directly to being, in the sense of the possible disclosure of things in themselves. In particular:

“Truth is not a relation that is ‘just there’ between two beings that themselves are ‘just there’ – one mental, the other physical. Nor is it a coordination, as philosophers like to say these days. If it is a relation at all, it is one that has no analogies with any other relation between beings. If I may put it this way, it is the relation of existence as such to its very world. It is the world-openness of existence that is itself uncovered – existence whose very being unto the world gets disclosed/uncovered in and with its being unto the world.” (p. 137)

As I have argued elsewhere, despite the indisputable insight involved in this rejection of all correspondence theories of truth (an insight which Heidegger in fact shares with many of the most perceptive philosophers of the analytic tradition), Heidegger’s own understanding of truth as simple disclosure is in many ways problematic from the perspective of a broader inquiry into the constitutive logical forms of judgments and assertions.¹⁰ In particular, as Ernst Tugendhat pointed out in his classic critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth as *aletheia*, it is deeply uncertain whether this sense of truth as primarily the disclosure of entities can in fact support a robust distinction between truth and falsehood at all. Understood simply as an event, the alethic disclosure of an entity would seem either simply to occur or not to occur, and Heidegger indeed sees no room in the basic concept of truth for the identification of presenting intention and fulfilling intuition that Husserl sees as occurring in the case of truth and failing in the case of falsity. Instead of consisting in any kind of identity or even adequation between an intentional act and its object, for Heidegger truth is simply the being-true of the entity itself, its being-revealed or being-present, and it is uncertain what we are to make, in this case, of an entity’s *failing* to be true, assuming it shows up at all. Nevertheless, Heidegger in fact devotes exhaustive analyses, here and elsewhere, to the original possibility of falsehood, which he understands as a kind of being-revealed but in the mode of being veiled or covered-up, and he holds here that the possibility of this veiling is itself to be found in the original structure of what he here calls the hermeneutic “as”, the pre-theoretical and pre-predicative structure in which something is revealed *as* something. This “as” structure gives, in a certain way, an original articulation to the entities that can be revealed, in turn making it *possible* to form explicit, predicative and judgments about them that combine names with non-nominative elements such as categorial expressions and the “is” of predication. But unlike Husserl’s correspondence theory, this yields, according to Heidegger, an understanding of truth that in no sense relies on psychic acts of comparison or identification, and in fact demonstrates the pre-eminently objective and original meaning of “truth”.

Despite this fundamental objection to the treatment of truth in Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger nevertheless continues to emphasize the crucial importance of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition for the actual interpretation of the overall sense of being itself. Heidegger here sketches the basic motivation for Husserl’s introduction of a fundamentally non-sensory type of intuition, emphasizing that in the presentation of what we already have in a simple perception, e.g. that “This chair is yellow and upholstered”, goes far beyond the sensuous matters perceived (the chair, its being-yellow, and its being-upholstered) to include essential elements (e.g. “this”, “and”, “is”) that we cannot ever perceive.

¹⁰“ Heidegger, Tugendhat, and Truth”

However, these moments, including importantly “being” in the sense of what is expressed in the perceptual assertion by the copula “is”, clearly also amount to essential aspects of what is actually perceived in itself. This is what leads Husserl to suggest categorial intuition as a distinct form of intuition capable of revealing what is ideal, by contrast with the real-sensory objects of sensory intuition. In fact, Heidegger suggests, with this Husserl has taken an essential leap forward, beyond empiricist, idealist, and subjectivist theories of consciousness and representation, precisely in that he has shown that “the non-sensory and the ideal cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective;” (p. 58) for Husserlian phenomenology, there is, in other words, a wholly distinct mode of being of categorial form and structure that cannot be reduced either to the sensory or to its representation or recombination in subjective consciousness. Indeed, the categorial structures demonstrated by categorial intuition, which always intrinsically “pervade” every act of even simple perception, are “nothing like consciousness”, but instead amount to a “special kind of objectivity” (p. 59), one which allows the objects and matters given in simple acts to be “disclosed *anew*, such that these objects come to explicit apprehension exactly as they are.” (p. 62)

Husserl has thus discovered in categorial intuition the actual possibility of accessing an objective dimension of form, whereby the actually existing state of affairs can be “characterized as a specific relation whose members give what is articulated in them the form of subject and predicate” (p. 64). This shows that “objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing...” (p. 66) but includes also the objective and objectively given formal structures that underlie the non-sensory moments and relations of any structured state of affairs, including the structure of the copula that links subject to predicate in a predicative judgment. This confirms, according to Heidegger, that “The categorial ‘forms’ are not constructs of acts but objects which manifest themselves in these acts. They are not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they actually present the entity more truly in its ‘being-in-itself’” (p. 70) Indeed, they “constitute a new objectivity” in the sense of letting the entity be seen in its objectivity (p. 71) As such, they point to a new “genuine form of research” (p. 71), one that is finally capable of “demonstrating the categories” and universals sought throughout traditional philosophy.

But although Heidegger thus sees categorial intuition as pointing toward the possibility of the givenness and intuitive presentation of an original and objective dimension of form, further interrogation of the status and possibility of this givenness now lead Heidegger to what is perhaps his most decisive and central criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole. Husserl’s development of categorial intuition, in connection with the phenomenological theory of intentionality and Husserl’s later distinction between the real, noetic and the ideal, noematic aspects of acts, has elicited the possibility of an original givenness of what Husserl understands as the “ideal,” the actuality of forms and categories that are given to consciousness in categorial intuition without being, for him, in any way real or temporal. But what Husserl has fundamentally failed to do is to clarify fundamentally the relationship of this posited “ideal” realm to the real temporal flow of consciousness itself. In the 1925-26 “Logic” course, Heidegger ventures to raise the question of the ideal and the real in phenomenology in a sense more radical, and

penetrating, than Husserl has been able to. In the critique of psychologism begun in the Prolegomena to the logical investigations, Heidegger suggests, Husserl has indeed decisively pointed out the fundamental shortcomings of a “naturalism” that remains rooted in “blindness to the non-empirical” and to “propositional content as such” (p. 42), which means, for Husserl “*ideal being*”; indeed, here Husserl’s critique is so successful that “Today we can hardly conceive...how anyone could believe that we could understand anything about the logical structure of what is thought as such – the “thought – by way of a psychological study of thinking.” (p. 43). Nevertheless, although the critique of psychologism must certainly be deemed successful in pointing out fundamental distinctions of being wholly overlooked by naturalistic accounts, it is in fact far from certain that Husserl’s understanding of the sense and structure of judgments as founded in “ideal” being is sufficient. For in order to gain actual clarity about this structure, it will be necessary for phenomenology (along with, Heidegger suggests, Marburg neo-Kantianism, which falls into similar problems) fundamentally to clarify the possibility of ideal, timeless structures being given in temporal consciousness. In fact, Heidegger follows Hermann Cohen in suggesting, the phenomenological critique of psychologism has in certain ways even *increased* the “danger” of a fundamental mis-interpretation of the multiple senses of being involved in the givenness of logical forms and structures as such:

That is, philosophy will be forced to confront the question about what really is the case with this ‘mental’. Can we simply brush off the act of judging, its enactment, or the statement, as something empirical and merely mental, as contrasted with a so-called ideal sense? Or does an entirely different dimension of being finally press to the fore here, one that can certainly be very dangerous once we glimpse it and expound it as something fundamental? Therefore we could say that although this critique of psychologism is from the outset utterly clear on the guiding distinction between empirical and ideal being, nonetheless the positive questions that now press forward from this distinction are quite difficult. These are questions that did not surface first of all in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, but that already engaged Greek philosophy, especially Plato. This distinction is the same as the Platonic one between sensible being, the *aistheton*, and the being that is accessible through reason or nous: the *noeton*. The inquiry today takes up again the question of the *methexis*, the participation of the real in the ideal, and it is up for grabs whether or not we can get clear on the phenomenon of thinking, of the thought, and more broadly of truth, by stating the problem in these terms. (pp. 43-44).

In other words, with the fundamental distinction between real, temporal acts and ideal, non-temporal contents, which it wields against the psychologistic doctrine of logic and understands as underlying the distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition, phenomenology runs directly into the very problem of participation that Plato already faced at the very beginning of systematic ontological research in the Western tradition. This is the original problem of the givenness of form, or of the relationship between what the ontological tradition understands as the ideal dimension of the thinkable to the reality of temporal processes and events. It is, of course, far from clear that Plato ever solved this problem, or even took himself to have an adequate solution to it; rather, it palpably forms the unresolved center of several of the dialogues usually attributed to the last stage of his career.

In any case, according to Heidegger, in simply presupposing the “Platonic” distinction between the ideal realm of form as timeless and the temporal realm of the sensory, Husserl has, despite the fundamental usefulness of the methods and tools of phenomenological research that he has introduced, ultimately failed to clarify the obscure sense or senses of being that actually underlie the possibility of the kinds of demonstration that phenomenology can achieve. Accordingly, while continuing to assert his complete agreement with the Husserlian critique of psychologism, Heidegger also ventures to raise a series of “anti-critical questions” (p. 74) that directly concern the larger and underlying issue of the relationship of the “real” to the “ideal”. If the ideal is to be conceptualized and thought about in real acts of thought, then must it not be present and at hand in some way alongside the real? “Do they border on each other like two regions of things – like the land and the sea?” (p. 75) Perhaps most centrally, is the relationship between the ideal and the real itself a real, or only an ideal, relationship? As Heidegger says, this is nothing other than the “old question” of participation, or the “*methexis* of the real (the sensible) in the ideal (the non-sensible).” The question that he here poses is, in fact, closely reminiscent of the notorious “third man” problem that Aristotle already found in Plato – if there is to be a relationship between the ideal, timeless being of forms and the real existence of sensory particulars, how are we to understand the status of this relationship itself? Formulated as a problem of predication, this is the problem of how the logical predicate is related or attached to the subject in a declarative, predicative sentence, or in the real state of affairs it represents. In fact, though, Heidegger suggests, it is not clear that any significant progress has been made with this problem in the two millennia since Plato.

In the context of Husserl’s own project, Husserl’s simple presupposition of the ideal/real distinction, which he fails along with the rest of the philosophical tradition to clarify, is in fact grounded in another failing, one which is ultimately responsible for what Heidegger sees as the decline of phenomenology into transcendental idealism, subjectivity, and an ultimately “personalistic” attitude that fails fundamentally to elucidate the very categories it presupposes. In particular, Heidegger suggests in the 1925 course, Husserl finally understands “pure consciousness” as the ultimate region of being, in which all others – the being of the real and spatiotemporal as well as that of the ideal – are constituted and given sense. But in so doing, Husserl has in fact *failed* to inquire into the “being of this region”, the actual ontological status of the “ur-region” of consciousness itself. (p. 102). Specifically, in thinking of consciousness as the ultimate region of the givenness of and constitution of being, Husserl has failed to inquire into the actual possibility of the subject of such consciousness himself to exist as a “real human being,” concretely and factually existing in a world. (p. 101).

This leaves the status of “transcendental subjectivity”, as Husserl conceives of it, radically ambiguous. On the one hand, the consciousness of the subject appears as the transcendental, ultimate, and pure region in which all sense, being, and the world itself is constituted. But on the other, in accordance with a “personalistic” tendency that Heidegger sees as first exemplified in Husserl’s 1910 essay “phenomenology as a rigorous science” and increasingly marked in Husserl’s work since then, the really existing entity that is capable of this transcendent consciousness is conceived as simply a natural, biological being to which rationality and consciousness are somehow adjoined. (p. 125). This is, of course, not simply equivalent to the naturalistic position that Husserl has so adamantly opposed. But

nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, it once again takes its orientation fundamentally from the traditional definition of man as the “animal rationale,” the organism, in itself simply natural, to which reason, logos, or spirit is secondarily somehow added as a kind of extrinsic possession. Within this framework, moreover, the reality of the psyche and its concrete acts of intentionality, though of course rigorously distinguished from the ideality of their content, nevertheless themselves appear to have the kind of status and temporality of natural objects and processes, wherein “every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world.” (p. 113) What is missing in this whole conception is, once again, a more penetrating inquiry into the kind of being of the being thus specified, and the “primary experience” of being-in-the-world that it enjoys.

Thus, according to Heidegger, Husserl’s phenomenology of subjectivity ultimately presupposes the being of an entity – Dasein – into which it has not sufficiently inquired. In this way, moreover, Husserl has in fact failed to clarify the genuine, underlying sense of intentionality itself, or to motivate how anything like an intentional relationship is possible to begin with. In order to accomplish this clarification, it would have been necessary for Husserl to recognize that “If the intentional is to be interrogated regarding its manner of being, then the entity which is intentional must be originally given” and “the original relationship of the being to the entity which is intentional must be attained.” (p. 110) In particular, according to Heidegger, it is necessary to ask about the “the entity that does not, as it were, cast a bridge over the gap between these two regions [i.e., the real and the ideal], but instead (if one has to understand it in this way) renders possible these two regions of being in their original unity?” (p. 75)

IV

As we have seen, this clarification of the original possibility for the worldly existence and disclosure of significance is just what Heidegger takes himself to have gained through his original description of Dasein and the hermeneutic method of displaying it by means of formal indication of its structures. This methodology that is itself derived from Husserl’s phenomenology and in particular from the decisive innovation of categorial intuition, but in turning these methods decisively toward the question of the actual sense of being, Heidegger can suggest that Husserl himself has essentially failed to take them far enough. Heidegger’s own radicalized phenomenological method, by contrast, is capable of eliciting the actual structure of the being, the entity, in whose structure the formal possibilities of meaning, judgment, and truth are originally given. As such, the methodology of hermeneutic interpretation and formal indication provides Heidegger’s own answer to the problem of the givenness of form, or of the availability of the constitutive categories of meaning and truth to intuition and experience in its concrete, temporal flow. Nevertheless, as Heidegger recognizes, all of this still leaves open the essential question of temporality itself. In particular, Husserl along with the entirety of the tradition conceive of the relationship of the ideal to the real as the relationship between two regions determinable most basically in terms of their temporality: the ideal is the region of the timeless, whereas the real is in time. The problem at the root of Heidegger’s objections to Husserl’s project is that of finding a way to cross the gap between these two “regions”; this is none other than the problem of finding a way for what is conceived as atemporal, ideal form really to enter into, to be given in, temporally flowing reality. And

here, even Heidegger's own radicalized methodology of formal indication is no help, unless it can clarify the fundamental possibility of the givenness of form that is at stake here with respect to its own temporality.

In fact, Heidegger suggests, once we conceive of the givenness of form as a matter of the figuring of atemporal ideals within temporal reality, this problem is basically insoluble: there is no coherent way to bridge the gap between the ideal realm of form and the real realm of temporal life it shapes, once these are distinguished as distinct regions, the one atemporal and the other within time. But this does not at all mean that Heidegger wishes simply to absorb form into the temporality of empirical life or return to the psychologistic assimilation of the givenness of form to datable acts of the empirical psyche. Rather, in one of the most profound and original gestures of his thought, he undertakes instead to interrogate in a more basic sense the very givenness of time itself. This is a radicalization of the question of the givenness of form along the lines of temporality itself.

To perform this radicalization, Heidegger once again draws centrally upon Husserl's phenomenological methods, developing them in the direction of a deeper posing of the question of the very sense and meaning of being as determined by time. In the *History of the Concept of Time* course, Heidegger presents as the third fundamental breakthrough of phenomenology (the first two are its discoveries of intentionality and categorial intuition) the discovery of the "original sense of the a priori." Of course, the notion of the a priori as "that which already always is the earlier" (p. 73) is already marked in Plato's understanding of the distinctive mode of existence of the forms, and in Descartes and Kant this "a priori" is thought in terms of the priority of the subject, as that which comes before and forms the basis for knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, it was left to phenomenology to identify, with its distinctive invocation of categorial intuition and its essential reference to the demonstration of ideality, to discover an a priori that is "not limited to subjectivity," and indeed "has primarily nothing at all to do with subjectivity." (p. 74) In fact, Heidegger suggests, despite Husserl's own official understanding of the categories as constituted in the category of "transcendental subjectivity," the real significance of the discovery of categorial intuition is ultimately to make it clear that "something like the highlighting of ideas occurs both in the field of the ideal, hence of the categories, and in the field of the real." (p. 74) In this sense, the a priori as phenomenologically disclosed in categorial intuition is in fact "not only something immanent, belonging primarily to the sphere of the subject," but also "nothing transcendent," in the manner of Plato's forms, either. In fact, the a priori is not, Heidegger suggests, the determinant of a specific mode or region of entities but rather an exemplary indication of one of the senses of being as such: it is "not a title for comportment, but a *title for being*." (p. 74)

Heidegger thus sees in Husserl's discovery of the "original sense of the a priori" a first and leading indication of the radical possibility of something like a disclosure of the sense of being as such, one that in itself owes nothing to the being of any specific entity, including that of the subject. In particular, if the *a priori* as disclosed through categorial intuition or its radicalized form, namely formal indication, is indeed completely indifferent to subjectivity, then it also has nothing to do with epistemology or the

order of knowledge, nor to the serial ordering of beings as “earlier” and “later”. Rather, according to Heidegger, it indicates an essential structure feature of being in itself:

Thus the first thing demonstrated by phenomenology is *the universal scope of the apriori*. The second is *the specific indifference of the apriori to subjectivity*. The third is included in the first two: the way of access to the apriori. Inasmuch as the apriori is grounded in its particular domains of subject matter and of being, it is in itself demonstrable in a simple intuition. It is not inferred indirectly, surmised from some symptoms in the real, hypothetically reckoned, as one infers...This leads to a fourth specification of the apriori. The “earlier” is not a feature in the ordered sequence of knowing, but it is also not a feature in the sequential order of entities, more precisely in the sequential order of the emergence of an entity from an entity. Instead, the apriori is a *feature of the structural sequence in the being of entities, in the ontological structure of being.*” (p. 74)

This formally indicated “earlier” will in fact survive and find direct expression in the “always already” which characterizes the distinctive ontological modality of the formally indicated structures of Dasein in *Being and Time*, the formally indicated structures of Dasein in being and time. But first, as Heidegger makes clear, it is essential to inquire into the temporality that *it* itself involves, and in particular to reconsider the specifically Greek determination of being as presence, which constrains the *a priori*, in the Greeks and all who follow them in the ontological tradition, to understand the *a priori* as the constant, underlying presence of an exemplary realm of entities – Plato’s ideas, the substance or substrate of the hypokeimenon for Aristotle, or the subject of Descartes and Kant. In particular, if, as Heidegger suggests, the historical “discovery of the apriori is really connected or actually identical with the discovery of the concept of being in Parmenides or in Plato,” (p. 75), it is necessary in reconsidering the “prevalence of this particular concept of being” to re-open a radical interrogation into the temporality presupposed in this traditional concept of being, the concept of being as presence that has constantly been presupposed since the Greeks.

Heidegger is thus led, finally, to take up once more the question of the possible givenness of the *a priori* dimension of the formal determination of the structures of the disclosedness and meaning of being, this time along the guideline of the essential question of the original givenness of time itself. In the 1925-26 *Logic* course, Heidegger opens this interrogation by identifying the essential connection that links the problem of truth to the temporality of being in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In particular, Heidegger suggests, Aristotle’s analysis in *Metaphysics IX 10* shows that the being of a being is, for him, essentially a matter of the unity of a gathering that must itself be understood as a matter of co-presence or presenting:

“We ask: What does *being* mean such that *truth* can be understood as a *characteristic of being*? As we have pointed out, Aristotle in *Metaphysics IX 10* introduced the idea that the being of a synthetic being means presence-unto: the presence-together of something with something in the *unity* of a present being. This unity, this primary presence that precedes and grounds

presence-together, must be understood as *presence, presenting* [Anwesenheit, Präsens].” (p. 161)

For Aristotle in particular, existing beings as the subjects of predication are capable of being revealed in truth only insofar as they can be synthesized or unified on the basis of the everlasting *stoichea*, or simple elements whose own mode of existence is conceived as eternal and as constantly underlying all possibility of change. This synthesis or unification that makes disclosure in truth possible, however, is itself a presenting; and the ultimate sense of this presenting for Aristotle is a ‘rendering present’ or ‘making present’ that means the same as “letting a present being encounter us in a now-moment.” (p. 163). This determination links the being of something disclosed in truth, in a fundamental way, to a particular determination of time: “To understand being as presence on the basis of presence-now means to understand being in terms of time.” Specifically, Heidegger suggests, this is the determination of time developed by Aristotle and constantly presupposed in the tradition since he wrote. On this determination, time consists in a constantly flowing sequence of presents or now-moments and the presence of anything is basically its presence in one of these moments or in an unchanging and unchangeable constancy, its “presence-now” (p. 163). To gain clarity about the problem of being, Heidegger suggests, it is therefore necessary to inquire into its relationship to the determination of time.

This inquiry is next undertaken by turning to Kant. Despite the fact that he, too, “held firm to the traditional concept of time” determined out of the objective presence of natural objects, Kant bears a particular significance for the analysis of the linkage of being and time since he was, Heidegger suggests, the “the only philosopher who even suspected that the understanding of being and its characteristic is connected with time” (p. 164). In particular, in a far-ranging analysis that looks forward in many ways to the “Kant book”, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* published in 1929, Heidegger interrogates Kant’s ontology as to the particular and ultimately aporetic conception of time that it presupposes, one which ultimately points to a wholly distinct structure of original temporality that breaks with the tradition’s constant understanding of being as presence. The argument is complex, and I can only recapitulate its rough outlines here. Heidegger proceeds backwards toward the temporal core of Kant’s ontology through a brief consideration of Hegel, wherein he attempts to show that Hegel, in understanding time as now, limit, and ultimate “this” essentially recapitulates Aristotle’s analysis in the *Physics* (p. 221): this is the characteristic determination of time within the philosophical tradition as the constantly flowing series of discrete “nows”. Here, time is determined out of space: spatial presence in the sense of the linear sequence of “nows” determines the fundamental sense of time. (p. 224) Turning to Kant, Heidegger suggests that even though he, too, remains trapped within a conception of temporality that is ultimately, like Hegel’s and Aristotle’s, determined as “the time of nature,” where “nature” in a broad sense includes “physical and mental nature”, nevertheless Kant’s determination of the subject as the transcendent source of the *a priori* also allows us to glimpse the problem of time in a more fundamental way. In particular, time has a “principled priority” for all of the analyses of the Critique of Pure Reason, occupying a privileged place in each of the three main sections of that work. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, time appears along with space as one of the privileged forms of the givenness of sensory appearances. In the Transcendental Analytic, time is treated as giving objectivity to our experience of

the world under the heading of the analogies of experience. Finally, in the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant considers the temporal status of the world, including the question of its origin and totality, in his treatment of the cosmological antinomies. (pp. 224-25).

In the Transcendental Analytic, time is a “form of intuition”, and in fact the most general form, underlying the appearances of both “inner” and “outer” sense. This means, according to Heidegger, that in each and every appearance, “time is the unthematically and antecedently (i.e. pure) presented basis on which a manifold is able to meet the senses.” (p. 229) This raises the question whether time, beyond simply being a form of appearance or intuition, can itself be intuited or presented, according to Kant, or more generally what kind of “presence” is involved in the formal apriority of this “unthematic and antecedent” basis. In fact, Heidegger suggests, Kant here obscurely suspects an original givenness of time as a “pre-viewed basis-on-which,” a givenness which, if correctly understood, would have pointed directly back toward a more original determination of temporality itself. However, because Kant still, following Descartes, conceived of the *a priori* as primarily the realm of the subject and the representations immanent to it, he misses this original givenness of time and the incipient phenomenological demonstration gets “mixed up” with the dogma of a subjectivism that will “later smother it.” (p. 231)

Similarly, in turning toward the deduction and availability of the categories of the understanding in the Transcendental Analytic, Heidegger argues, Kant’s understanding of the pre-formation of the conditions of the possibility of objective understanding again points to the problem of the givenness of time. Here, Kant understands knowledge as essentially arising from the “two stems” of sensibility and the understanding: this carries forward the traditional distinction, already present in Aristotle, between aesthesis and noesis, what is given directly to the senses and what is thinkable by the mind, as separable types or factors of knowing. In order for what is sensorily given to be knowable as an object or objectivity, it is necessary that what is given in sensibility be further determined by the categories of thought. In the Transcendental Analytic, according to Heidegger, Kant understands this determination essentially as an ordering and a synthesis, the synthesis of a “manifold” of appearances which can give unity to the objects thus understood. This requires, beyond the “forms of intuition” that space and time themselves are in the Aesthetic, an original ordering of this manifold by means of what Kant calls a “formal intuition” that yields an ordering and determination of the object. In connection with this it is possible, as Kant says, for both space and time to be present as “infinite given” magnitudes (p. 246-47), and so the presentation that the formal intuition makes possible also gives space and time as unlimited wholes (p. 249). Furthermore, in the analogies of experience, Kant understands the formal ordering of the manifold of appearances into time as an aspect of the unification of appearances and judgments, which is ultimately determined by the unity of transcendental apperception, the unity of the “I think.” (p. 255). This raises a fundamental question about the way time is given for Kant: “What is the condition of the possibility of the determinability of time as such in an “I think”? Or even more precisely: What is the condition of the possibility that time as such and an “I think” can be together?” (p. 255). The answer points in the direction of a primordial givenness that Kant figures as the synthetic action of the subject, without, however, being able to further clarify its fundamental structure. More generally, for Kant,

“Givenness as such is possible only in a ‘for’ that is constituted by an original synthesis that is expressed as the “I think.” (p. 275). But this a priori givenness is itself possible only insofar as the understanding, in the “I think”, is directed toward appearances given in the original form of time.

In each of these cases – the pre-given basis of the forms of intuition of inner and outer sense, the formal basis of the synthesis of the manifold to produce temporally ordered objectivity, and the formal combinability of representations in the transcendental unity of the “I think” – Heidegger interrogates the possibility and necessity of the givenness of form and finds it to lie in a more original givenness of time. In each of these cases, form is the “pre-viewed basis on which” entailed by the very idea of ordering, what renders coherent the possibility of any appearance or understanding. But the ultimate basis of this ordering for Kant, Heidegger suggests, remains the spatialized time of the tradition, the linear succession of present moments or “nows”. This time is itself, Heidegger now suggests, drawn from Kant’s understanding of nature and from the kind of ordering appropriate to it. Kant’s question, though, is not ultimately about the temporality of nature and natural laws, but about the sense of the “a priori” which must in fact be able to answer to the guiding question of the first Critique, that of the possibility of *synthetic a priori knowledge* (which is in no way drawn from nature).

In fact, Heidegger now ventures to suggest, the synthetic character of this knowledge points the way to a more original givenness of time that is implicit in Kant, a kind of time that is not at all drawn from natural relations or the schematization of their order. In this original time, what Kant determines as the a priori of the transcendental subject reflexively provides to itself the very forms which themselves make possible all givenness; that is, time in this sense, is an “antecedent letting a pre-viewed basis-on-which be given.” That is, it is the reflexive movement in which the self supplies itself with its own formal basis, the very condition of givenness. This is, in other words, time as “original, universal, pure self-affection.” (p. 280)

In this analysis of how time is presupposed in each of the major parts of Kant’s project, Heidegger thus recapitulates the decisive question of the givenness of form he discovers his answer in the original givenness of time, in such a way to elicit original time as the ultimate formal basis of givenness itself. In each case, moreover, Heidegger rejects Kant’s tendency to think of this ultimate form in terms of the action of a subject itself conceived as *a priori* in the sense of existing in a mode of simple exteriority to time; rather, the possibility of the a priori of the subject is itself to be conceived more radically in terms of auto-affection as the reflexive (self-)givenness of time *itself* in supplying the formal conditions for any possible making-present. Here, as Heidegger emphasizes, time is no longer understood as Kant does, as a quasi-spatial form of mathematical order, a succession of present-nows, but is rather understood as the very constitutive structure of presenting that makes anything like a present (in a spatial or a temporal sense) possible at all. But to understand time in this way is simply, once more, to understand it from out of the formally indicated structure of Dasein as the being whose meaning is to make-present (p. 333). Thus, in final answer to the question of the relationship of the “I think” and time in Kant,

The difficulty is resolved with one blow once we take seriously time as making-present. The “I think” is not *in* time (Kant is completely right to reject that) but *is* time itself, or more exactly,

one mode of time – that of pure making-present. As pure making-present, human existence itself is the “for-which” of whatever it might happen to encounter; and making-present is human existence’s way of letting-something-encounter-it. (p. 335)

To understand time in this radicalized way as pure auto-affection is to comprehend the possibility of all givenness of form and structuration from out of the primary structure of *dasein* and the pure structure of its reflexive relation to itself, the auto-affection in which it gives itself time. But as Heidegger says here, the basic structure of *Dasein* in its capability of disclosing beings is itself presenting or making-present. Thus, in a determination which will survive long after *Being and Time* itself, Heidegger will understand the possibility of the disclosure of being from out of the basic reflexive structure of a givenness that gives the possibility of the present in general from out of the self-givenness of time. This structure will remain essential in Heidegger’s thought about truth, time, and disclosure long after he turns from the “preparatory” analytic of *Dasein* to the later project of the “history of being”, yielding the disclosive structure of what he later characterizes as the “clearing” in which beings can appear in the light of intelligibility and of the “there is” – the “es gibt” that ultimately points to the givenness of time and being themselves.

Thus, if Heidegger ultimately sees, behind the traditional categorial understanding of the givenness of form in the privileged atemporality of the *a priori*, a more original and universal self-givenness of time, this self-givenness nevertheless remains formally/hermeneutically indicated as the very giving of presence, the form of presenting as such. It is from out of this formally indicated structure that all disclosure and presenting of beings is possible, but insofar as what is thereby formally indicated is the self-givenness of time, it also makes possible the disclosure and light of Being itself. For time, radically understood, is not “the being of some entity” but rather “the condition of possibility of the fact that there is being (not entities)” at all (p. 338). In the original reflexivity of the self-givenness of time, Heidegger thus comes to perceive an exemplary formal determination of the very possibility of presenting as such. But here, presenting is no longer limited to the disclosure of beings or to the priority of the present. It is, rather, simultaneously, the radically conceived formal ground for anything like the light of intelligibility from and in which all beings emerge, something like the form of Being as such.

V.

I have argued that Heidegger’s development of the existential structures of *Dasein* in the years leading up to *Being and Time*, as well as much of his increasingly radical understanding of the guiding determinations of the ontological and metaphysical tradition in those years, is best understood as the outcome of his penetrating pursuit of the problems of the givenness of form. In his development of the methodology of formal indication, in his deepening and radicalization of Husserl’s discoveries of categorial intuition, intentionality and the *a priori*, and in his penetrating analysis of the ultimate temporal basis for Kant’s determination of the synthetic activity of the subject in representing, thinking, and judging, Heidegger relies again and again on the dimension of form to provide an answer to the

question of the basis for the structurally unified basis of presenting itself . In each of these cases, the appeal to form points to the unity of determinative structure, the “one” of a unified structural basis that subsumes and unites the plurality of the phenomena. This is a sense of “form” that need not be understood primarily in the sense of the Aristotelian form/matter distinction, but rather points toward the older Platonic sense of the “one over many” and to the ancient problem to which it answers. This, in turn, raises the old question of the basis of the one, of the kind of being capable of unifying the plurality of appearances into the unity of what can be thought, or the link between the one and Being itself that figures in the Platonic discussion of participation and in the characteristic Platonic designation of the idea as “the thing itself.” Quite apart, then, from his rigorous and decisive critique of the Plato’s determination of forms as timeless, eternally present entities, Heidegger will have suggested nothing more than that the ontological tradition understands time and the possibility of the being of beings in terms of this unifying function of form, the obscure capacity to gather the many into the unity of a one, which is at least one of the problematic senses of the Platonic “methexis”. Indeed, in his critique of Husserl and his radicalized development of the methods of phenomenology, Heidegger ultimately suggests, as we have seen, that the formally indicated structure of Dasein as original temporality is to be understood precisely in terms of a self-givenness of time that reflexively produces the temporality of the world from a position within it.

But if, as I have argued, the question of the obscure givenness of the unity of form plays a determinative role in leading Heidegger to his breathtakingly radical reconsideration of the structure of time itself, it must nevertheless be admitted that the question of form as the unity of the one, does not actually predominate in the analytic of Being and Time; instead, the formal determination of the existential structures of Dasein from out of the existentiell tends there to be effaced or obscured under determinations such as “primordially,” “ontic-ontological” priority, originality, or the authentic. However, if these determinations indeed continue to capture the modified sense of a priori that Heidegger still understands basically in terms of the unity of form,

This is the question of the extent to which the great Heideggerian project of the determination of the sense and truth of Being can be understood as itself determined through the unifying dimension of form, or put in other terms, how the One of form measures and determines Being itself. The answer to this originally Parmenidean question is far from clear on the basis of Heidegger’s text, and it is not at all clear that it even *can* be answered on its basis. But along these lines it seems at least possible that the Heideggerian inquiry into Being could itself be recovered and even radicalized by renewing this original Parmenidean question.

More humbly, I conclude by posing three questions for future research. They are meant as both hermeneutically directed toward what may be new possibilities for reading the Heideggerian text, and substantively directed toward the matters themselves.

- 1) **With respect to the structure of presenting:** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger famously asserts that truth in the original sense of disclosure remains dependent on Dasein -- thus “there is truth, only insofar as Dasein is,” -- and furthermore specifies the possibility of all intelligibility and

disclosure as dependent on the holistic context of Dasein's worldly involvements, for instance its actual activities of coping and handling in a world. One way to understand this is as asserting a thoroughgoing dependence of all phenomena of significance on the activities or structure of Dasein. Thus Heidegger is read as a "temporal" (Blattner) or "linguistic" (Lafont) idealist; alternatively, those who emphasize the situatedness of practices and practical contexts of disclosure understand Heidegger as an "ontic" realist along the lines of the avowed embodied and cultural reality of practices and communities (Carman, Dreyfus). Elsewhere (Braver, Meillassoux), Heidegger is read as what is today sometimes called a "correlationist:" one who ultimately joins with idealism and humanism in submitting being in itself to the dictate and law of human thought or action.

But as we have seen, in *each* of the cases where Heidegger draws on phenomenological methods, he emphasizes that their whole value lies in their capability to elicit the possibility of pointing to Being in a sense that is *in no way* subjective or determined by the being of the subject. Rather, these are objective structures and ontological orderings of being *in itself*, and their significance for eliciting the real structure of disclosure and truth does not lie in their accidentally being taken up by historically specific individuals or cultures, but rather in the way they point to the structure of Dasein, which is itself understood as the structure of presenting *as such*. And here, Heidegger avoids absolutely any implication of idealism, humanism, or the subjective determination of the categories of objectivity: thus "Presenting is absolutely not subjective or subjectivistic or idealistic in the usual, epistemological meaning of those words. Rather, it is simply being unto the world, wherein the world can show itself in its in-itself-ness in terms of its various levels of approximation and determination." (p. 343)

Therefore, is there to be found, along the lines of Heidegger's radical confrontation of the problem of the givenness of form, an understanding of the being of Dasein and the disclosure of Being itself that has nothing to do with the human as such and is thoroughlygoingly realist? If so, the question of form would apparently point the way to a Heideggerian realism that is not merely "ontic" but actually, in a proper sense, "ontological" as well – a formal realism of the disclosive structure of time that makes all disclosure and presence possible, and in which alone, as Heidegger says, anything like the Being of beings can come to light. This realism would, again, apparently specify the ontological conditions of this disclosure as something that has nothing to do with specifically human cultures, attitudes, activities, individual or collective practices, shared attunements, and the like, but can only be understood formally from out of the completely formal reflexive structure of Dasein – being-there—itsself.

- 2) **With respect to "Being itself:"** – As we have seen, Heidegger's interest in categorial intuition and Husserl's other innovations is first and foremost that they provide ways of pointing to what is in fact *intrinsic* to the sense of Being as it gives itself, quite independently of the being of objects *or* of subjects. Thus, for instance, the whole importance of Husserl's categorial intuition lies in its ability to elicit an ideal realm that is neither objective in the mode of nature, nor subjective in the sense of being the result of the activities of the thinking subject; and the

importance of Husserl's discovery of the "original sense" of the *a priori* is itself that it elicits the absolutely non-subjective but nevertheless determinate dimension of the "always already" of Dasein's own structure. Indeed, the formal indication of this structure is itself ultimately directed toward not toward bringing into view not beings or subjects, but toward the source of the presenting and intelligibility of all beings in Being itself. This basic structure of this disclosure and sourcing remains much the same even when Heidegger abandons the analytic of Dasein for his later inquiry into the historical epochs of Being, in which, in each case, Being determines the Being of beings by revealing itself and holding itself back.

In light of the formal indication of the structure of being as the source of the possibility of disclosure and ultimately as correlative with the self-givenness of time, how, then, should we understand the prospects for a formal disclosure of "Being itself"? Must we understand Being simply as the obscure and formless, if inexhaustible, "source" of all intelligibility, about which we cannot (further) speak, and which therefore can only be pointed out indirectly by means of art or poetry, or else cloaked within a mystical, mute piety? Or is there then a formal or meta-formal determination of Being itself precisely in the structure of its donation of sense, even as it can never be understood as a being, and even as it itself, within the historical tradition of metaphysics, constantly withdraws?

- 3) **With respect to logic, language and time:** – One of the most important registers of "form" in contemporary philosophical thought is the one inaugurated by Frege's radical discovery of quantificational logic and the constitutive forms of logic and language that it demonstrates. Frege's own tendency, of course, was to see the basis of formal logic in Platonistic terms, as evidencing the transcendent structure of a timeless "third realm" accessible to pure thought. In the further development of the analytic tradition, the question of form has been developed most deeply as an investigation into the structure and nature of language, and recent discussion has privileged what some see as the intersubjective, culturally specific and pragmatic structure of language or its naturalistic determinants in the empirical biology and neurophysiology of language processing. To the (limited) extent that he reckoned with them at all, Heidegger understood or would have understood all of these developments simply as further expressions of the reigning metaphysical tradition in its constant assumption of presence and in line with the dominant, technological and nihilistic understanding of Being characteristic of the age. But upon closer examination, as I have argued elsewhere, the forms that are elicited by the analytic tradition's ongoing inquiry into the structure of language (forms of language and of life as well as of logic in a narrow sense) cannot be understood simply as further entities simply present at hand, and in fact the dimension of the formal that emerges in modern formal/symbolic logic simply cannot be reduced to the empirically or anthropologically described structure of human biology or intersubjective practice.¹¹ Rather, as I have suggested elsewhere, this is the original

¹¹ *Philosophy and the Vision of Language.*

dimension of form that Wittgenstein figures, in its constant but itself groundless presupposition, as the primary givenness of “forms of life.”¹²

Despite Heidegger’s constant and often ill-informed attacks on the project of using formal-logical results or methods as a guideline or basis for ontological thought, it is therefore worth asking whether some of the formal devices and structures demonstrated in the course of the analytic tradition might help, in ways that Heidegger himself did not suspect, to point toward the complex formal situation that Heidegger is indicating in the analytic of Dasein and beyond. I can do no more than point to possibilities here, in very broad terms. But it is notable, in particular, that the analytic tradition possesses a sense of the temporal structure of language that is quite different from Heidegger’s, as well as a correlative formal schematization and thinking of language’s limits and structure, including its reflexive capacity of figuring itself. This is, essentially, the structuralist conception of the linguistic sign as a formal element, capable of infinite repetition yet always appearing materially in concrete instances. But it may be that the reflexivity of language that this elicits bears an intimate relation with what Heidegger understands as the reflexivity of time, the original structure of its giving of itself.

In particular, as we saw in connection with Kant, Heidegger ultimately radicalizes the question of the givenness of form, the givenness of unity, as the question of the givenness of time and answers this with an original reflexive structure of self-giving. *Is there, then, a formal determination of primordial time that specifies or schematizes its self-giving?* Does there remain such a determination even when Heidegger understands the givenness of time not simply in terms of the structure of Dasein but also in terms of the epochs of the disclosure of the being of beings? Is there a schematism or a formal indication of reflexive temporality that determines this self-giving that originally gives the unity of a present? To what extent do the formal features of reflexivity *as such* determine essentially, or manifest indicatively, the original structure of time as it gives itself?

¹² *The Politics of Logic* (see especially chapter 1).